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This paper adopts Chadwick and Solon’s (2002) model by using family
earnings in the study of intergenerational earnings mobility with a highlight
on the role of assortative mating. I analyze mean and quantile regression co-
eﬃcients as well as transition matrices to investigate family earnings mobility
between parents and daughters, and parents and sons from Swedish register
data. My ﬁndings indicate that Sweden has a higher degree of mobility com-
pared to the U.S., and that assortative mating also plays an important role as a
channel through which income status is transmitted across generations in Swe-
den. However, the diﬀerence in intergenerational mobility patterns between the
two countries does not, inherently, depend on factors that aﬀect the marriage
match. Swedish daughters and sons exhibit a rather similar scheme of inter-
generational earnings transmission. Daughters tend to be slightly more mobile
than sons and the diﬀerence between their elasticity estimates is small but
statistically signiﬁcant. The quantile regression approach reveals that parents’
family earnings are less important as explanatory variable at the upper end of
the children’s earnings distribution than it is at the bottom while transition
matrices show substantial earnings persistence in the top earnings class.
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11 Introduction
The intergenerational earnings mobility between parents and children has been widely
examined over the past ﬁfteen years. However, most of the studies focus on the
relationship between fathers and sons.1 A possible source of this disproportionality is
an unconscious discrimination which follows the old tradition of studying only male
prototypes also in natural sciences, for instance, testing new medications only on
men to study their eﬀects on people, even on women. It is, however, motivated in
the empirical context, where researchers have resorted to omitting mothers due to
the discontinuous labour force behaviour of a large share of women during the 1960s.
The lower rate of married women’s labour force participation compared to men’s,
raises the frequency of non-observed earnings in the estimation, and complicates any
analysis of intergenerational relationship involving mothers and daughters. Even in
the ﬁeld of sociology, researchers have long had diﬃculty in assigning women to their
appropriate social class. The uncertainty concerning their economic status fueled the
growth of studies which use the occupation of the women’s husbands, instead of their
own, as the criterion of their social classiﬁcation. This, in its turn, has been a source
of discord in the sociological literature (see Erikson, 2005 for a review).
Studies in intergenerational earnings mobility, which include daughters and moth-
ers are still sparse.2 Österberg (2000) uses Swedish tax data ﬁl e sf r o m1 9 7 8t o1 9 9 2
to estimate the intergenerational income mobility between pairs of mother-daughter,
mother-son and pairs of father-daughter, father-son. She found high intergenerational
income mobility between fathers and sons compared to the U.S., and that mothers’
earnings correlate more strongly with daughters’ earnings than with sons’, though
they have less inﬂuence on children’s earnings compared to those of the fathers.
1See for example a survey in Solon (2002).
2Several studies originated from U.S. data, among others, Peters (1992), Mazumder (2001) and
Chadwick and Solon (2002); and another from British data is Dearden et al. (1997).
2Since intergenerational earnings mobility is characterized by the transference of
economic status from parents to children, family structure, and thus, marriage match
plays an important role as background in evaluating the degree of association between
their economic achievements in terms of family income. The fact that people tend to
marry within their own socio-economic class, i.e, marriage homogamy, is of interest
as pooling economic (dis)advantages makes society more closed and immobile, and
leads to an intergenerational reproduction of inequality (Blossfeld and Timm, 2003).
Assortative mating clearly inﬂuences the correlation between parents’ and children’s
family earnings, although its link to the intergenerational mobility pattern has not
been discussed much in the economic literature. An important exception is, however,
a study by Chadwick and Solon (2002), which examines the intergenerational income
mobility among daughters with a highlight on assortative mating.3 It also suggests
a way to get around the problem of observing the income of women who do not
participate or participate only intermittently in the labour force, by using family
income as a measure of economic status. Chadwick and Solon (2002), (henceforth
C&S), use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data on daughters and sons
born between 1951 and 1966. They ﬁnd smaller, though substantial, income elasticity
estimates for daughters compared to sons, and that assortative mating plays a key
role in the income transmission process in the United States. According to their
results, the earnings of the spouses are as elastic as the oﬀspring’s own earnings with
respect to the parents’ income.
In this paper, I adopt the same approach by using such a broader measure of
income as family income in the analysis of daughters’ intergenerational earnings mo-
bility in Sweden. I also focus on the role of assortative mating as one of the possible
channels through which economic status is passed on from one generation to an-
3Other studies which consider the role of assortative mating in the intergenerational earnings
mobility are Lam and Schoeni (1993, 1994) and Ermisch et al. (2006).
3other. The United States and Sweden are long known to represent extreme cases in
a comparison of income inequality among developed countries. It is, thus, interesting
to investigate how such countries relate to each other in terms of the intergenera-
tional transmission of family income and assortative mating. Therefore, I ﬁrst follow
C&S’s empirical outline closely to be able to compare my main results with those
they found for the United States. The second aim of the paper is to conduct a par-
allel study for sons, in order to compare patterns of the intergenerational mobility
between daughters and sons in Sweden, and then extend the analysis by exploring
possible nonlinearity. Furthermore, like C&S, I examine the role of assortative mat-
ing in the transmission of economic status across generations, but in addition, I also
investigate whether similarities and diﬀerences exist between married couples and
those who are merely registered as cohabitants with joint children. My contributions
are mainly the consideration of the role of assortative mating in intergenerational
earnings mobility, an issue which has been given scant attention in this ﬁeld. The
large and representative sample of Swedish data promises better precision compared
to the PSID-based U.S. estimates, and allows the use of quantile regression as well as
an exploration of mobility patterns in the diﬀerent parts of the daughters’ and sons’
income distribution.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the theory and
econometric framework, section III describes the data used, and section IV contains
the empirical results of the Sweden-U.S. comparison. In section V, the Swedish results
from quantile regressions and transition matrices for both daughters and sons are
presented as well as a sensitivity analysis. The last section concludes and summarizes
my ﬁndings.
42 Theory and econometric framework
2.1 Assortative mating and intergenerational mobility
Intergenerational earnings mobility is the extent of the earnings transmission across
generations. A society where the children’s earnings distribution is completely in-
dependent of their parents can be deﬁned as having a complete intergenerational
mobility. Assortative mating is the “mating of individuals having more traits in com-
m o nt h a nl i k e l yi nr a n d o mm a t i n g ” . 4 The process of "who mates with whom" can
shape the persistence of a family’s position in the earnings distribution from parents
to children, and consequently aﬀects the perpetuation of earnings inequality through
generations.
An elementary version of the model developed by Lam and Schoeni (1993, 1994)
illustrates the role of assortative mating in intergenerational earnings mobility.5 For
simplicity, assume that all daughters marry and participate in the labour force. The
intergenerational determination of the daughters’ earnings can be expressed with the
regression equation:
logEwi = αw + βwy0i + εwi (1)
where logEwi denotes the permanent component of log earnings for a daughter from
family i, y0i denotes the permanent component of her parents’ log family income.
The error term  wi reﬂects the combined eﬀects on the daughter’s earnings of fac-
tors orthogonal to parental income, and βw is the intergenerational elasticity of the
daughter’s long-run earnings with respect to her parents’ long-run income, which is
positive if daughters tend to inhabit the same economic position as her parents.
4Deﬁnition from WordNet 2.0, 2003 Princeton University.
5This section follows closely Chadwick & Solon (2002) as well as Lam & Schoeni (1993, 1994).
5Assume, as Lam and Schoeni do, that assortative mating can be summarized by
ac o r r e l a t i o nγ between the daughter’s log earnings and her husband’s log earnings:
γ = Corr(logEwi,logEhi) (2)
where logEhi is the permanent component of the husband’s log earnings. The model
does not take into consideration the family labour-supply behaviour which explains
the frequency with which married women do not participate in the labour force.
Despite its simplicity, it is practical for the empirical analysis and it presents some
i m p o r t a n ta s p e c t so ft h er o l eo fa s s o r t a t i v em a t i n gi nt h ep e r s i s t e n c eo fi n c o m ei n -
equality across generations.
First, Lam and Schoeni (1994) state that the regression of the daughter’s hus-
band’s log earnings on her parents’ log income can be written as:
logEhi = αh + βhy0i + εhi (3)







If individuals’ mating is completely random and not conditional on earnings, i.e.
γ =0 , then βh would be zero. But in the case of a positive assortative mating on
earnings, the elasticity βh would be positive.
Lam and Schoeni (1993) aﬃrm that it is possible for husbands’ income to be
more correlated with their wives’ family backgrounds than with their own family
backgrounds. The husband’s earnings may thus be as elastic as the daughter’s own
earnings with respect to her parents’ economic status. According to (4), this holds if
6there is a high degree of assortative mating and if the husbands’ earnings exhibit a
larger variance than those of their wives.
Second, this model illustrates the relationship between the daughter’s family in-
come and that of her parents. Assume that the daughter’s family income consists
only of her own earnings and her husband’s, as is the case in my data, and let S
denote her husband’s share of their combined earnings. Then the elasticity of the
daughter’s family income with respect to that of her parents is
β = Sβh +( 1− S)βw (5)
the share-weighted average of the separate elasticities of the daughter’s own earnings
and her husband’s. If there is no assortative mating on earnings so that βh =0and if
the husband’s earnings are greater than the wife’s, then the daughter’s family income
is much less elastic with respect to her parents’ income than her own earnings are.
But if there is a high degree of assortative mating and βh is just as large as βw,
then the association between the daughter’s family income and that of her parents
is mainly due to her husband’s earnings in the typical family where S is much more
than half.
Unlike the simple model in this section, my empirical analysis also considers in-
dividuals who, in addition, are not married and those who do not participate in the
labour force.
2.2 Model and econometric framework
Let y1i denote the permanent component of log family income for a daughter from
family i and y0i for her parents. The transmission of family income across generations
can be expressed with the regression equation
7y1i = α + ρy0i + εi (6)
where the slope coeﬃcient ρ is the intergenerational elasticity of long-run income.
The elasticity indicates what percentage above the average the oﬀspring’s earnings
are predicted to be in their own generation if their parents’ earnings are one percent
above the average, a generation prior. If the logarithmic earnings variables in the
parents’ and oﬀspring’s generations are of approximately equal variance, then the
elasticity will also be the correlation between log earnings in the two generations.6
Ideally, permanent income should be used in the estimation, but often, researchers
have resorted to using a measure of income in a given year, because datasets usually do
not pursue either oﬀspring or their parents long enough to enable direct measurement
of permanent income. The daughter’s log family income in year t is thus modelled as
y1it = y1i + δ1 + γ1A1it + λ1A
2
1it + υ1it (7)
where A1it is the age of the daughter from family i in year t,a n dυ1it is a transi-
tory ﬂuctuation around her long-run income-age proﬁle due to both actual transitory
movement and random measurement error. Similarly, the parents’ log family income
in year s can be modelled as
y0is = y0i + δ0 + γ0A0is + λ0A
2
0is + υ0is (8)
6Note that whereas intergenerational correlation is a measure of positional mobility and is insen-
sitive to changes in inequality, elasticity measures how much economic diﬀerences across generations
persist over time. Thus, elasticity incorporates changes in inequality (Aaronson and Mazumder,
2005).
8A0is is the age of the biological father in the year s. The relationship between the
daughter’s log income in year t and the parents’ log income in year s is





Since υ0is absorbs heterogeneity due to diﬀerent life-cycle proﬁles, the equation in-
corporates the age and age squared of both parents and children in order to correct
for the fact that they are not observed at the same point in their life. A least-squares
estimation on this regression of the daughter’s log income in year t on the parents’ log
income in year s and age controls for both generations, would give rise to a correlation
between the key regressor y0is and the error term υ0is. This results in an errors-in-
variables problem leading the estimated coeﬃcient to diﬀer from the true coeﬃcient
of the intergenerational elasticity ρ.That is, ˆ ρ would suﬀer from the classical errors-








¢ h ρ (10)
where σ2
y denotes the population variance in parents’ permanent income y0i and σ2
ν
is the variance of the measurement noise υ0is. To reduce this error-in-variables bias,
an average of parental log income will be used instead of a single year income. The
least squares estimation is applied to the regression
y1it =( α + δ1 − ρδ0)+ρ¯ y0is+γ1A1it+λ1A
2
1it−ργ0 ¯ A0is−ργ0 ¯ A
2
0is+εi+ν1it−ρ¯ νois (11)
where ¯ y0i is the average of the sum of the parents’ log income. ¯ A0i is the average age
of the father over those years, ¯ A2
0i the average of his squared age, and ¯ νoi averages
9the measurement noise over those years.
Now ˆ ρ h a st h es a m ep r o b a b i l i t yl i m i ta sa bo v ea s i d ef r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h ea v e r a g e d
noise variance ¯ νoi replaces the single-year one σ2
ν . This variance of the averaged noise
is smaller under a broad range of assumptions.7
After the estimation of the intergenerational income elasticity with the above
method, I examine the sample of married daughters thoroughly by redeﬁning family
earnings in equation (11) as the log of the sum of the daughter’s earnings (Ewit)
and her husband’s earnings (Ehit). As shown before, the elasticity of a couple’s
combined earnings with respect to the daughter’s parents’ income can be written as
β = Sβh +(1− S)βw where βh is the elasticity of the daughter’s husband’s earnings
with respect to her parents’ income, βw is the elasticity of her own earnings and
S =
Eh
(Ew+Eh) is the share of her husband’s earnings in combined earnings. The log of
the couple’s combined earnings is
log(Ewit + Ehit)=l o g( Ehit) − log(Sit) (12)
where Sit is the share of the husband’s earnings in couple i’s combined earnings in
year t.
In addition to estimating β with log(Ewit + Ehit) as the dependent variable, I also
reestimate the equation with log(Ehit) respective log(Sit) as the dependent variable.
The diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient vectors in these last two regressions is equal
to the coeﬃcient vector in the regression with log(Ewit + Ehit) as the dependent
variable.
An estimate of βh, the elasticity of the husband’s earnings with respect to the
daughter’s parents’ income stem from using log(Ehit) as the dependent variable.
7However, the use of a multi-year average of current income does not solve entirely the incon-
sistency problem in estimating the intergenerational elasticity. See for example Haider and Solon
(2006) and Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006).
10Similarly, estimating the regression with log(Sit) as the dependent variable produces
an estimate of βS , the elasticity of the husband’s share with respect to the daughter’s
parents’ income. If βS =( 1− S)(βh − βw) is close to zero, then βw ∼ = βh , i.e., the
elasticities of the daughter’s earnings and her husband’s earnings with respect to her
parents’ income are nearly the same.
3D a t a
I use high-quality Swedish data, which stem from population registers gathered by
Statistics Sweden (SCB). One advantage of this dataset is the possibility to identify
both biological and nonbiological parents of oﬀspring. Another clear advantage over
the data used by C&S is the large size of the dataset which promises very precise
estimates. Further, unlike the PSID data, it is a dataset of individuals rather than of
households, although it gives information about the spouse of married persons and
cohabitants with joint children. This gives an opportunity to study separately the
sample of jointly taxed couples and permits a comparison between them and married
couples.
The data set consists of a 20 percent random sample of the Swedish population
born in Sweden between 1962 and 1965.8 The multigenerational nature of the register
helps link each of these individuals to either their own biological parents or the
parents they live together with, in the case of adoption, by merging the individual
data together with parental data. I use information about the biological parents to
identify mothers and fathers.
The total sample size consists of 86,145 individuals with 44,093 females and 42,052
males. The sample is divided into four categories each for both daughters and sons.
8Note that the random sample consists only of Sweden-born individuals, thus immigrants are not
included in the analysis.
11The ﬁrst three categories are the full sample, the married sample and married whose
spouses have a positive income. The variable describing an individual’s marital status
is deﬁn e di nt w ow a y s :t h o s ew h oa r em a r r i e da n dt h o s ew i t hj o i n tc h i l d r e n . T h e
fourth category, which oﬀers a way to further explore the existence and magnitude
of assortative mating, is a sample of cohabiting couples with joint children, who are
not registered as married but are presented, in the data, as jointly taxed.9
The data regarding income and earnings are taken from tax-register data (Utdrag
från Inkomst och Förmögenhetregistret) for the years 1970 and 1975 for the parents
and 1999 for the oﬀspring. Since it has been shown that observing individuals early
in their careers tends to underestimate the intergenerational elasticity of income, the
children’s earnings are measured in 1999 when they are 34 to 37 years old. Their
income at this age should reﬂect well their long-run income, at least for the sons.
Although this might not be the case for daughters, the use of the husband’s earn-
ings to measure the daughter’s economic status should resolve the conspicuous bias
due to gender diﬀerence at these ages.10 Haider and Solon (2006) have shown that
the strong life-cycle pattern in the correlation between current and lifetime earnings
causes intergenerational earnings elasticities to be highly sensitive to the age at which
oﬀspring’s earnings are observed. Also Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) found empir-
ical evidence that the age at which current earnings are likely to most closely proxy
l i f e t i m ee a r n i n g sc a nv a r yb yf a c t o r ss u c ha sg e n d e r ,c o h o r ta n dc o u n t r y . 11
There are two measures of earnings suitable for the purpose of this study: labour
earnings and total income. The income and earnings concepts are deﬁned as follows.
Earnings include income from work, wages and salaries; these cover self-employment,
sickness beneﬁts and parents’ allowance. Total income consists of earnings and tax-
9Jointly taxed cohabitants are stated as samtaxerade in the Swedish tax register.
10Note that maternity allowance is comprised in the labour earnings.
11However, neither Haider and Solon (2006) nor Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) use family income
in their studies.
12able transfers but also includes capital income. Both measures of income are used
in the estimation of intergenerational elasticity between parents and children. The
log family income, which consists of the sum of the mother’s and father’s average of
labour respective total income measured in 1970 and 1975, is used for a better proxy
of permanent income. Since married women’s earnings often are a poor indicator
of their position in the earnings distribution, like C&S, I use the wife’s share of a
couple’s combined earnings to predict women’s earnings.12
Descriptive statistics for daughters and sons, using labour earnings, are shown in
Table 1. The full sample contains 37,044 daughters and 38,674 sons. The mean age
of both the daughters and sons is 35.43.13 The mean of log family earnings in 1999
for the daughters is 12.49 implying a mean of 266,000 SEK for the level of family
labour earnings. For the sample of sons, the mean of log family earnings is 12.51,
that is roughly 271,000 SEK. In the daughters’ families of origin, the father’s mean
age in 1970 is 36.63 and her parents’ average of 1970 and 1975 log family earnings is
10.61. the corresponding ﬁg u r e sf o rt h es a m p l eo fs o n sa r ea l m o s tt h es a m e .
4 Sweden and United States comparison
The ﬁrst part of the empirical analyses applies a least squares estimation mainly on
equation (11). The baseline speciﬁcation is a regression of the log of daughter’s (son’s)
family earnings in 1999 on the log of parents’ family earnings averaged over the years
1970 and 1975, controlling for the age of both parents and oﬀspring.14 Thereafter, the
speciﬁcations will vary with the use of diﬀerent dependent variables and the results
12But unlike the PSID- variable they use in their study, the deﬁnition of “family income” in my
data does not include income from other family unit members.
13In C&S, the mean age at which daughter’s income is observed is 33.57.
14Quadratic speciﬁcations for the age proﬁles may seem too restrictive, I use year of birth dummies
to control for the daughters’ and sons’ year of birth instead.
13alter from one sample to another. Table 2 shows the estimated intergenerational
elasticities for daughters, using labour earnings. The right side of the table reports
the equivalent estimates from C&S as a means of comparison, though one has to
be careful in comparing between studies, by keeping in mind the very diﬀerent data
sources used.
The estimation process starts with the full sample of 37,044 daughters. The elas-
ticity of a daughter’s family earnings with respect to her parents’ family earnings
is 0.249. The Swedish estimate is lower than the 0.429 C&S have found for the
United States and the standard deviation is 82 percent lower than theirs. This result
is, though, consistent with previous studies which established that intergenerational
earnings mobility, in general, is greater in Sweden than in the United States (Björk-
lund and Jäntti (1997), Österberg (2000)). This also lends support to the notion
that the impact of family background on economic status is not as strong in Sweden
as in the United States. For instance, Björklund et al. (2002) found that brother
correlation in long-run earnings is around 0.25 for Sweden while it is about 0.40 for
the U.S. Since brother correlation is a more expansive measure of the inﬂuence of
family and community background than the child-parents earnings correlation, this
can partly explain why the U.S. elasticity estimate exceeds the Swedish one.
T h en e x ts t e pi st oe x p l o r et h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ha s s o r t a t i v em a t i n gp l a y sar o l ei n
intergenerational mobility with a focus on the sample of married daughters.15 When
estimating the intergenerational elasticity in family earnings for the 17,455 married
daughters, the estimate increases marginally to 0.250.16
The third sample consists of married daughters whose husbands have positive
15A parallel estimation for the subsample of 8061 unmarried daughters produces an estimate of
0.194 with the standard error 0.015. Note that cohabitants are not included in the married sample.
16Since C&S have two diﬀerent dependent variables, family income and couple’s combined earn-
ings, they reestimate the intergenerational elasticity with log(Ewit + Ehit), i.e., the sum of a couple’s
earnings as the dependent variable, and ﬁnd that the elasticity falls further from 0.429 to 0.387.
14earnings. The 340 cases where the husbands’ earnings are either missing or nonposi-
tive are eliminated and 17,115 married daughters remain for the rest of the analysis.
The elasticity estimates decline from 0.250 to 0.240 when using family earnings as
the dependent variable. Pursuing the econometric setup presented in Section 3, I
decompose the last estimate into the parts associated with the daughter’s earnings
and her husband’s earnings.
First, I begin with the estimation of the elasticity of the daughter’s husband’s
earnings with respect to her parents’ earnings and get a smaller estimate of 0.231.
C&S, however, found that the estimate of a daughter’s husband’s earnings with re-
spect to her parents’ income is very close to what they got when using the log of a
couple’s combined earnings as dependent variable, mainly 0.35 versus 0.36. Second,
I estimate the elasticity of a daughter’s husband’s share of their combined earnings
with respect to her parents’ earnings. According to equation (5) in the economet-
ric framework, the elasticity of the couple’s combined earnings with respect to the
daughter’s parents’ earnings is a weighted average of the elasticity of her earnings
and her husband’s earnings with respect to her parents’ earnings.
The last estimate reported in Table 2 reveals that βh = βw, that is, these two
elasticities are nearly equal since the two numbers averaged together are about the
same size. The daughter’s earnings are, thus, almost as elastic with respect to her
parents’ earnings as her husband’s earnings are. This is conﬁrmed by the small, and
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, discrepancy of -0.009. However, since the weight
of the husband’s elasticity is his share of the couple’s combined earnings, the elasticity
of the husband’s combined earnings seems to contribute more heavily in the sum.
This can be explained by the fact that, in the typical couple, the husband’s earnings
constitute a large part of the couple’s combined earnings. C&S get the same result
in their analysis but with a positive statistically insigniﬁcant, discrepancy of 0.01.
15The diﬀerence between βS in my results and in C&S is primarily due to diﬀerence
in S, the husband’s share of couple’s combined earnings. This, in its turn, can be a
reﬂection of unequal rate of female labour force participation in the two countries.
The husband’s share of couple’s combined earnings is, presumably, large when women
do not enter the labour market and small in the case of higher rate of female labour
force participation.
The results of a parallel analysis for sons are displayed in Table 3. The intergen-
erational income elasticity of Swedish sons with respect to their parents is 0.296 for
the full sample of 38,674 sons. The estimate for sons is larger than that of daugh-
ters 0.249. The Chi2 statistic for the contrast between these estimates is 8.34 with
a probability value of 0.004, so the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. According
to previous studies, the Swedish estimates for intergenerational earnings elasticity
between fathers and sons range from 0.13 to 0.28 (see Björklund et al. (2005) and
Jäntti et al. (2006) for a survey). These ﬁgures are slightly lower compared to the
0.296 I ﬁnd here, for sons. However, other literature on this topic reveals that sons
exhibit larger elasticity estimates when the parents’ family earnings is the measure
of parental status (see Solon,1992).
Although statistically signiﬁcant, the diﬀerence in the size of the estimates for
daughter’s and the son’s elasticity is not substantial. However, the results suggest
that daughters tend to have greater mobility compared to sons. This lends support to
the previous ﬁnding of Österberg (2000), which reports rather low elasticity estimates
for fathers and daughters ranging from 0.062 to 0.083 depending on diﬀerent sample
selections, and corresponding estimates of 0.125-0.185 for fathers and sons. Moreover,
a more recent study of Jäntti et al. (2006) shows a higher intergenerational elasticity
coeﬃcient of 0.258 between fathers and sons and 0.191 for fathers and daughters. C&S
also get a higher estimate for sons, 0.54 compared to 0.43 for daughters. However,
16the contrast between these estimates is not statistically signiﬁcant in their analysis.
As for the sample of 15,069 married sons, the elasticity of the son’s family earnings
with respect to his parents’ family earnings is a little higher, 0.258. In order to
estimate the intergenerational elasticity for sons with positive earnings, 235 cases
had to be dropped. The resulting estimate is almost the same, 0.257, when using
family income as the dependent variable. When decomposing this estimate further, a
slightly diﬀerent pattern emerges for sons and daughters. The elasticity of the son’s
own earnings with respect to his parents’ earnings is 0.297. Whereas the discrepancy
between this estimate and the 0.257 estimate of a couple’s combined earnings is
slightly larger and statistically signiﬁcant for sons with 0.040, it is both negative and
not signiﬁcant for daughters with -0.009. This indicates that the elasticity for the
son’s own earnings and the spouse’s earnings are not deﬁnitely of the same magnitude
unlike the case for the daughters’ sample. One factor that may account for this
diﬀerence is that own earnings make up a smaller fraction of total family earnings for
daughters than for sons.
C&S end up with the same result for both daughters and sons in their analysis.
They found that the son’s elasticity exhibits a much higher estimate in the range
of 0.508-0.535, and the discrepancy is -0.030 with 0.046 in standard error, thus,
statistically insigniﬁcant. Moreover, C&S show that though assortative mating is
playing a role in the transmission of economic status across generations for both
daughters and sons, it is less important for sons than for daughters.
In the light of the above results, assortative mating appears to be a channel
through which economic status is passed on from one generation to another in Sweden.
Assortative mating seems to play more of a role for Swedish daughters than for sons
given that βS is not statistically signiﬁcant for daughters while it is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for sons. These ﬁndings also infer that the diﬀerence in the
17daughters’ and sons’ intergenerational mobility patterns between the two countries
does not, inherently, depend on factors that aﬀect the marriage match. In other
words, the diﬀerence in assortative mating γ is not the cause of disparity rather
than a diﬀerence in the labour market structure and earnings determination process.
The coeﬃcients of βh and βw are quite similar for Sweden and the U.S. though of
diﬀerent size. They are larger in the U.S. results compared to the Swedish ones
reﬂecting the underlying lower level of cross-sectional income inequality and higher
intergenerational mobility in Sweden.
To magnify the role of assortative mating for intergenerational income mobility, a
similar exercise as above is conducted, this time with the fourth sample, composed of
couples who are not registered as married in the data set but are reported as jointly
taxed. The results of a parallel study of this sample are displayed in Table 4 and 5
below. In order not to confuse the results with those of the married couples discussed
previously, it is worth emphasizing that "samtaxerade" or jointly taxed individuals
are formally deﬁned as either married or unmarried but having children together. In
this section, the observed individuals are not married but they have children together
and might, presumably, be long-term cohabitants. Although some of them might not
speciﬁcally live together in the same household, having children together qualiﬁes
them among jointly taxed individuals. The intergenerational elasticity estimates of
the jointly taxed daughters and sons sample is overall, smaller than those of the
married daughters and sons, hence even lower compared to the U.S. estimates for
married couples. The OLS estimate for the jointly taxed daughter’s sample of 25,516
is slightly lower than the previous elasticity for the married daughter’s sample, 0.250.
The elasticity of jointly taxed daughters whose cohabitants have positive earnings
is marginally lower than the corresponding ﬁgure for the married daughter sample,
0.230 compared to 0.240, when family labour earnings is the dependent variable.
18Following the same procedure described in equation (5), the estimate declines when
the log of "husband’s" earnings is used as the dependent variable. In the case of
jointly taxed sons, the corresponding estimate rises slightly from 0.238 to 0.282. As
for the sign and magnitude of the discrepancy, it is very similar to what was found
before for married sons and daughters.
Jointly taxed couples seem to be more intergenerationally mobile than married
ones. This can be explained by the fact that married individuals are likely to be
more traditional than cohabitants. This in turn would mean that individuals who are
cohabiting tend to live together with individuals who might necessarily not belong to
their own socio-economic class. However, assortative mating is also at work for the
merely jointly taxed daughters and sons. Hence, the general results do not change
appreciably depending on the deﬁnition of married sample. Whether individuals are
married or merely jointly taxed, the intergenerational earnings transmission and the
eﬀect of assortative mating are the same.
5 Swedish sons and daughters comparison
5.1 Quantile regression results
We now leave the comparison of the intergenerational income mobility between Swe-
den and the United States, and instead extend the analysis by a comparison between
the Swedish sons and daughters by using a quantile regression approach and taking
the possibility of nonlinearities into account.
The mean regression coeﬃcients show that although statistically signiﬁcant, the
diﬀerence in the size of the estimates for daughter’s and the son’s elasticity is quite
small. However, is it possible that the explanatory power of the parents’ earnings is
diﬀerent for the daughter (son) ending up at the top of the daughter’s (son’s) earnings
19distribution, than it is for the daughter (son) at the bottom of the distribution?
Mean square error measures the eﬀect of the explanatory variables on the condi-
tional mean of the dependent variable. Quantile regression as introduced by Koenker
and Bassett (1978), on the other hand, estimate the conditional quantile functions,
models in which quantiles of the conditional distribution of the response variable are
expressed as functions of observed covariates. Just as the sample mean can be de-
ﬁned as the solution to the problem of minimizing a sum of squared residuals, the
median can be deﬁned as the solution to the problem of minimizing a sum of absolute




θ|yi − xiβ| +
X
i∈{i:yi≺xiβ}
(1 − θ)|yi − xiβ| (13)
where yi is the dependent variable, which is the log of son’s and daughter’s family
earnings in 1999, xi is the k by 1 vector of explanatory variables, the log of parents’
family earnings averaged over the years 1970 and 1975, with the ﬁrst element equal to
unity. The coeﬃcient vector is β and θ is the quantile to be estimated. The coeﬃcient
β will diﬀer depending on the particular quantile being estimated.
Quantile regression estimates the marginal eﬀect of an explanatory variable at
an arbitrary point in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. It is a
well-suited method to answer questions concerning the tails of the distribution rather
than the mean and to address the issue of the diﬀerence between individuals who lie
at the top of the distribution and those at the bottom.
To gain further understanding about the sons’ and daughters’ earnings mobility, I
proceed by using quantile regression to uncover possible patterns at the tails of their
conditional earnings distribution. The same speciﬁcation as in the mean regression
above is used, that is regressing the log of daughter’s (son’s) family earnings in
1999 on the log of parents’ family earnings averaged over the years 1970 and 1975,
20controlling for ages of both parents and oﬀspring. The results are displayed in Table 6
and 7.17 At ﬁrst sight, the median estimate seems lower overall compared to the OLS
estimate. The uppermost of both tables shows that the estimates gradually decline
from the lowest quantile toward the 0.25 quantile, rise then drop again at the 0.75
quantile to ﬁnally increase toward the top. This W-pattern is apparent for both the
full samples of daughters and sons. Another common pattern is the large size of the
estimates at the bottom and the top quantiles, however, they are of higher magnitude
at the 0.05 quantile with 0.350 respective 0.266 for the daughter’s sample, and with
0.454 compared to 0.278 for the son’s sample.
For the full sample and the married sample of daughters, the estimates are greater
at the bottom quantile though both the bottom and the top display larger ﬁgures
than those in between. The reverse is truef o rt h es a m p l eo fm a r r i e dd a u g h t e r s
whose husbands have positive earnings, the elasticity is greater at the top than at the
bottom quantile, with 0.235 versus 0.257, but this is only the case when using family
labour earnings as the dependent variable. The discrepancy between the elasticity
of the daughters’ family labour earnings and the elasticity of her husband’s earnings
with respect to her parents’earnings, is less negative the higher the quantile is, from
-0.024 to -0.031. Here, a word of caution is in order. The restriction imposed on
the estimates does not hold when using quantile regression instead of least-squares.
This means that the elasticity of couple’s combined earnings and the elasticity of the
husband’s share of couple’s combined earnings with respect to the daughter’s parents’
family earnings do not add up as described in equation (5). Consequently, one should
abstain from drawing any conclusions about the role of assortative mating in the
earnings transmission process.
17Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are calculated for the OLS regressions and boot-
strap standard errors are reported for the quantile regressions. For more details, see Efron (1982)
and Wu (1986).
21As discussed in Koenker and Bassett (1982), the test for equality of coeﬃcients
across quantiles is based on the asymptotic normality of the estimated parameters. A
standard Wald test is formed using a bootstrapped estimate of the covariance matrix.
Formal tests of the null hypothesis of equality of parents’ earnings coeﬃcients across
the 0.05-0.95 ranges are rejected with zero p-values for all three samples and diﬀerent
speciﬁcations.
The same general structure in the daughters’ results appears for the sons except
that the size of the estimate of the parents’ family labour earnings is largest at the
0.10 quantile instead of the 0.05 quantile, for the married sample. The estimate
at the bottom is the largest, overall, despite both the top and the bottom quantiles
displaying larger estimates than the middle ones. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
the 0.05 quantile coeﬃcient estimate of the elasticity of the sons’ earnings with respect
to his parents’ earnings, falls by almost a half in the full sample, from 0.454 to 0.241 at
the 0.25 quantile. For the married son’s sample, the estimates drop from 0.433 at the
bottom quantile to 0.209 at the 0.25 quantile, which is a decrease of about 52 percent,
when using the son’s earnings as the dependent variable. Although one cannot say
much about its meaning, it is, however, interesting to observe that the discrepancy
falls from 0.078 at the bottom quantile to -0.008 at the top, thus reaching its minimum
at the 0.95 quantile. The equality of the parents’ family earnings coeﬃcients across
all quantile ranges also is rejected with zero p-value for all three samples of sons and
for the various speciﬁcations.
In this analysis, the quantile regression results are highlighting that parents’ family
earnings is a less important explanatory variable at the upper end of the children’s
earnings distribution than it is at the bottom tail of the distribution. These ﬁndings
seem to convey that both the daughters and sons exhibit a similar pattern of higher
intergenerational earnings elasticity at the top of the income distribution than at the
22bottom. Eide and Showalter (1999) also found, when using quantile regression on the
PSID and High School and Beyond (HSB) data, that the intergenerational earnings
correlation between fathers and sons is greater at the bottom of the son’s conditional
earnings distribution than at the top. They even found that estimating only the
mean eﬀect of the father’s earnings by least squares is restrictive. This also applies
here because the variation between the observed eﬀect of the parents’ earnings on
t h ec h i l d r e n ’ se a r n i n g sa tt h ed i ﬀerent quantile would have been concealed had one
only used the least squares method. Estimating solely the mean eﬀect of the parents’
family earnings would indeed have been restrictive. Interestingly, the daughters’ and
sons’ intergenerational earnings mobility features seem to exhibit more resemblance
than diﬀerence, and the use of a quantile regression method somehow conﬁrms the
previous results from the least-squares estimation.
5.2 The transition matrix approach
So far, the least squares method and the quantile regression approach applied in
the estimation of intergenerational elasticity have shown a rather small contrast in
patterns of mobility for the Swedish daughters and sons.
According to Hertz (2005), two components constitute intergenerational mobil-
ity: the conditional expectations of income given parents’ income and the degree of
variation around this expectation. The ﬁrst component is captured by the intergen-
erational regression equation while the other one is not. Expected mobility may also
be estimated about the conditional median instead of mean by using least absolute
deviations, a quantile regression at the median, instead of least squares. Although
elasticity measures how much the economic diﬀerences between families is expected
to persist over time, it does not say anything about the probability of unexpected
outcomes, that is, the probability of the proverbial rags-to-riches transition. Since
23elasticity is much more a measure of intergenerational persistence than mobility, there
is a risk that considering solely the regression coeﬃcients might conceal important
diﬀerence in mobility patterns between daughters and sons. Mobility matrices, on
the other side, magnify the likelihood that an adult son or daughter moves in the
earnings distribution relative to his or her parents’ place a generation prior. Like
the quantile regression, mobility matrice has the advantage of allowing for asymmet-
ric patterns, for instance, more mobility at the top of the distribution than at the
bottom or vice versa. But the diﬀerence between quantile regression and transition
matrices is that the later oﬀers a possibility to estimate the observed probability of
moving from and to any point in the earnings distribution, which is the function of
both the expected and unexpected components of mobility. The quantile transition
matrix approach gives further information about the nature, direction of mobility,
and movement across the earnings distribution. Thus, the construction of transition
matrices is complementary to the use of autoregressive models estimated above.
Previous researchers in this ﬁeld have used transition matrices to illustrate the
diﬀerences across the distribution of the child’s earnings compared to that of the par-
ents. Peters (1992) and Dearden et al. (1997) construct quartile transition matrices,
and in both studies, about one-third of sons born to fathers in the bottom quartile
rose to the top half of the income distribution. They also ﬁnd that there is less mo-
bility at the top and bottom of the distribution, and that sons born to fathers at the
two extremes of the income distribution are more likely to occupy the same position
as adults, compared to sons born to fathers with incomes in the second and third
quartiles. Jäntti et al. (2006) examine earnings mobility among pairs of fathers and
sons, and fathers and daughters across the U.S., the U.K. and the Nordic countries
with the help of mobility matrices. They ﬁnd that persistence is greatest in the tails
of the distribution though it tends to be high at the upper ends.
24I, now, turn to the analysis of a decile transition matrix relating the daughter’s
(son’s) position in the earnings distribution to their parent’s position. This consists
of dividing the population into ten equal sized categories, ranked in order of earnings,
and presenting the distribution of parents and children across these categories. The
extreme cases of mobility can be detected as follows in a transition matrix. If the
parental earnings distribution is not relevant in determining the child’s distribution,
then all elements of the matrix, i.e. the probability, will not diﬀer from 0.10. In the
opposite case of complete immobility where the child’s current position in the earnings
distribution is absolutely shaped by the position that his or her parents had in their
generation, everyone stays on the leading diagonal of the matrix. In other words,
the diagonals will all contain a one and the rest, a zero. The advantage of a decile
transition matrix over a quartile one is that it oﬀers a more detailed depiction and a
ﬁner desegregation of intergenerational mobility. However, a possible disadvantage of
the use of a transition matrix is that nonlinear pattern could partly reﬂect ceilings and
ﬂoors at the top and bottom of the matrix, since an upward mobility is not possible
for those born at the top and a downward mobility for those born at the bottom.
H e n c e ,t h ed e g r e eo fi m m o b i l i t ya tt h et o pa n db o t t o mm i g h tb ee x a g g e r a t e d . I n
that case, the use of regression models, which is not subject to this limitation might
be preferable.
Table 8 and 9 display the transition matrices by deciles of labour earnings, for
the sons and daughters full sample. At ﬁrst sight, a striking fact is the notably
large ﬁgures for the top deciles of both daughters and sons, suggesting that the least
amount of mobility exists for those whose parents are found in the highest decile
group. According to Table 8, if the parents belong to the highest decile group, there
is a 24 percent probability that the daughter will also end up in the highest decile
group of the earnings distribution. The corresponding probability is 14 percent for
25those whose parents are found in the bottom decile group. It seems that chances of
falling one decile for those on top are larger than chances of rising one decile for those
born at the bottom.
In the case of the relationship between parents and sons, about 27 percent of sons
b o r nt op a r e n t si nt h et o pd e c i l eg r o u pa l s oh a v ee a r n i n g si nt h et o pd e c i l eg r o u p ,
while only 16 percent of those whose parents belong to the bottom decile group,
end up in the bottom of the earnings distribution as adults. Similar patterns occur
for both daughters and sons, given that the most dominant signs of immobility are
apparent in the top earnings class. This can also be seen when looking at the leading
diagonal of the matrices, the biggest proportion of daughters and sons who remain
in the same decile group as their parents is at the top, i.e., those who belong to the
highest family earnings decile group. The proportion though is a little higher for sons
than for daughters, reinforcing the above ﬁndings when using regression models, that
daughters tend to be somewhat more mobile than sons.
Kendall’s tau-b statistic is a measure of the degree of association in the transition
matrices, it is constrained to lie between -1 and +1. This statistic is 0.116 for the
daughter’s full sample and 0.153 for the son’s full sample. Though the statistic
shows a positive and rather weak relationship, it points to the fact that the linkage
between the son’s economic status and that of his parents is more important than
the association between the daughter’s and her parents’ earnings. 18
Given the parent’s earnings decile group, the probability that married daughters
and sons end up in a certain decile group is reported in Table 10 and 11. If the parents
are in the top earnings group, there is a 27 percent chance for a married daughter to
be in the same group. The equivalent probability for a married son is slightly higher,
29 percent. The same pattern as above clearly emerges when considering the sample
18According to Peters (1992), the tau-b statistic falls slightly when deciles are used though the
pattern of results is not sensitive to whether earnings are grouped by quartiles, quintiles or deciles.
26of married daughters and sons, the least amount of mobility still exists for those whose
parents are found in the highest earnings decile. Nonetheless, some distinctions can
be worth mentioning. Kendall’s tau-b statistic is higher for the married sample,
0.207 for the sons and 0.182 for daughters. This can be interpreted as a positive
sign of assortative mating, the degree of association in earnings between the married
daughters (sons) and their parents and in-laws seems somewhat stronger. Moreover,
the probability for married sons whose parents belong to the top decile group, to end
up in the middle and lower decile group is rather small compared to the full sons’
sample. The same tendency can even be noticed for married daughters. About four
percent of daughters born to parents in the top decile group have earnings in the ﬁfth
decile group, and only four percent of married sons from the top decile group end up
in the second decile group as adults.
The results shown in the transition matrices suggest substantial mobility, espe-
cially when looking at the probabilities in the middle of the earnings distribution
which are around 0.10. However, there is an asymmetric pattern, the immobility of
earnings across the generations is more important at the extreme ends of the earnings
distribution for both daughters and sons, though virtually more at the top than at
the bottom. More immobility at the top than at the bottom means, in general, that
children of rich parents are less likely to end up poor whereas those of poor parents
tend to end up rich or at least belonging to the middle class. The higher probabilities
for those who stay at both the top and bottom of the parents’ earnings distribution
denote an underlying non-linearity and can be an indication that ceilings and ﬂoors
are likely to exist at the top and the bottom of the transition matrices. The nonlinear
pattern is due to the fact that those at the top are limited from further upward mobil-
ity and those at the bottom are restricted from moving downward. Corak and Heisz
(1999) also show non-linearities in the association of income across generations when
27using mobility matrices and nonparametric techniques to analyze data on Canadian
men. They ﬁnd that intergenerational income mobility between fathers and sons is
much greater at the lower end of the income distribution than at the upper end.
Österberg (2000) found some evidence of non-linearities in her analysis, and that,
in general, father’s earnings correlate more weakly with the daughter’s earnings than
with those of the son. However, she discerned the most dominant signs of immobility
in the middle income classes. This probably depends on her use of a quartile instead
of a decile matrix and the fact that the lack of mobility in the highest classes is
not visible because of the broader deﬁnition of the income classes in her analysis.
On the other hand, Peters (1992) and Dearden et al. (1997), when using transition
matrices to investigate intergenerational income mobility, have found that sons are
more mobile with respect to their parent’s income, in comparison to daughters.
As Dearden et al. (1997), I use three rankings indices and ranking systems in
order to compare the pattern of earnings mobility between daughters and sons.19 For
the ﬁrst index, as with the measure of elasticity, the smaller the sum of the elements
of the leading diagonal and the adjacent cells is, the higher the mobility. A large value
of both the Bartholomew and the Shorrocks index indicates a high sign of mobility.
According to the ranking indices in Table 12, the daughters are clearly more mobile,
i.e., more independent of their parents’ position in earnings distribution compared to
the sons. The diﬀerence in magnitude between the daughter’s and the son’s index is
quite small. Whereas the index of the diagonal is larger for the married sample than
the full sample, both the Bartholomew and the Shorrocks index are smaller. The
larger value of the index for married sons compared to married daughters gives an
19The rankings indices are (i) a simple summation of the elements of the leading diagonal and the
adjacent cells where the larger the index size, the higher the mobility; (ii) a weighted mobility index
suggested by Bartholomew (1982) which, if aij is the proportion of daughters or sons in quantile





aij |i − j|; (iii)an index which satisﬁes the
mobility axioms, deﬁned by Shorrocks (1978), for a matrix A as (n − traceA)/(n − 1).
28insight that married daughters are slightly more mobile than married sons.
5.2.1 Sensitivity analyses
Since the transition matrices gave a hint about possible nonlinearity in the data, I
tried a number of sensitivity analyses using diﬀerent speciﬁcations in order to test
the robustness of the results of the linear model estimated previously. First, I used
both quadratic terms and year of birth dummies to account for the oﬀspring’s age
when estimating the earnings transmission across generations with OLS and quantile
regression. I also changed the constraint on the oﬀspring’s age to include only daugh-
ters and sons born in 1962 and 1963. The same general pattern of results remains
and is present across the quantiles despite those various speciﬁcations. I use total
income as well in the estimation, the basic results are the same as those from labour
earnings and are presented in the Appendix.
Moreover, I tried to mimic the analysis in Österberg (2000) by dividing my orig-
inal sample into mother-daughter, mother-son pairs and father-daughter, father-son
pairs, using the earnings measures corrected for the diﬀerence in age between the gen-
erations, to see whether intergenerational elasticities would get about as low as what
she found, mainly between 0.053 and 0.030 compared to 0.071 and 0.131. Although
I get smaller coeﬃcient estimates in the results when using individual earnings cor-
rected for age, the magnitude of the elasticities does not belong to the small range
stated above. One important reason for this divergence in the results is the diﬀerent
data used. Another reason is the diﬀerent time period which plays a rather critical
role in the measurement of the mothers’ earnings. Österberg (2000) observes mothers
under a three-year period, from 1978 to 1980, while I have only data for mothers’
earnings for an earlier period of 1970 and 1975. As a result, 43 percent of mothers
in my study have zero earnings for at least one year compared to only 18 percent
29of mothers in her analysis. Regardless, my main results conﬁrm those she found in
her study, namely that daughters are more mobile than sons and that Sweden does
have a higher degree of mobility compared to the U.S. Moreover, this study oﬀers a
potential solution to the diﬃculty she was confronted with, mainly a more reliable
indicator of mothers’ status by using family income as a measure of their economic
status. Further, the mean age of 53 at which fathers are observed in her empirical
study, can partly explain the rather low elasticity estimates in her results. Grawe
(2006), when examining several studies from diﬀerent countries, pointed out that
t h e r ei sas i g n i ﬁcant negative relationship between the father’s age and the estimated
intergenerational earnings persistence. According to Grawe (2006), observing fathers
late in the lifecycle, for instance, at the age of 53 as opposed to age 34, tends to
reduce earnings persistence estimates by 0.18.20 This is mainly due to a lifecycle bias
which follows from the rise in the variance of permanent earnings over the lifecycle.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper examines the extent of intergenerational earnings mobility among daugh-
ters and sons in Sweden. Using high-quality data from population registers gathered
by Statistics Sweden (SCB) and a broader measure of income status, family earnings,
I obtained estimates that range from 0.231 to 0.250 for daughters and 0.257 to 0.297
for sons. These ﬁgures are smaller than those found for the U.S. though my using
of family income as a measure of economic status yields somewhat larger elasticities
than those previously estimated in Sweden. My results also conﬁr mt h ef a c tt h a tt h e
impact of family background on economic status is not as strong in Sweden as in the
United States.
20The mean age at which the fathers’ earnings are observed in my analysis is 36.63 for daughters
and 36.62 for sons.
30A comparison between Swedish daughters and sons suggests that daughters tend
to have greater mobility compared to sons. Assortative mating appears to aﬀect the
intergenerational earnings transference for both daughters and sons in this study.
The elasticity for the son’s own earnings and the spouse’s earnings are of the same
magnitude, unlike the case for daughters. Assortative mating seems to play more of
a role in the transmission of economic position for daughters than for sons. My ﬁnd-
ings show that the diﬀerence in the daughters’ and sons’ intergenerational mobility
between Sweden and the United States does not, inherently, depend on factors that
aﬀect the marriage match, but rather on the diﬀerence in the labour market struc-
ture, policies and earnings determination process. The degree of assortative mating
is somewhat larger in the U.S. results compared to the Swedish ones, probably be-
cause of the underlying lower level of cross-sectional income inequality and higher
intergenerational mobility in Sweden.
A separate analysis of jointly taxed couples exposes that they tend to be some-
what mobile than married ones. Assortative mating is also at work for the merely
jointly taxed daughters and sons. It is still less important for daughters than for
sons, so the general results do not change appreciably depending on the deﬁnition
of married sample. Regardless of whether individuals are married, cohabitants, or
merely jointly taxed, the pattern of intergenerational earnings transmission and the
eﬀect of assortative mating are the same.
When using the quantile regression approach, the parents’ family earnings are
revealed to be less important in explaining the children’s earnings distribution at the
upper end of the distribution than at the bottom tail. These ﬁndings convey that
both daughters and sons exhibit a similar pattern of higher intergenerational earnings
elasticity at the top of the income distribution than at the bottom. This variation
between the observed eﬀect of the parents’ earnings on t h ec h i l d r e n ’ se a r n i n g sa t
31the diﬀerent quantile would have been concealed had one only used the least squares
method. On the whole, the daughters’ and sons’ intergenerational earnings mobility
features exhibit more similarity than diﬀerence, and the use of a quantile regression
method conﬁrms the previous results from the least squares estimation.
Similar patterns occur for both daughters and sons, given that the most dominant
signs of immobility are apparent in the top earnings class when using a quantile
transition matrix method. Looking at the leading diagonal of the matrices, the biggest
proportion of daughters and sons who remain in the same decile as their parents is
those who belong to the highest family earnings decile. The proportion is higher for
sons than for daughters, reinforcing the above ﬁndings when using regression models,
that daughters tend to be more mobile than sons. The general results shown in
the transition matrices suggest considerable mobility, despite an asymmetric pattern,
immobility of earnings across generations is more important at the extreme ends of
the earnings distribution for both daughters and sons, though virtually more at the
top than at the bottom. Children of rich parents are less likely to end up poor whereas
those of poor parents tend to end up rich or at least belonging to the middle class.
The ranking indices attest that daughters are more independent of their parents’
position in the earnings distribution compared to sons. Married daughters, also, show
more mobility than married sons, an indication that assortative mating aﬀects sons
more than daughters, and a further conﬁrmation of the results from the mean and
the quantile regression analysis.
The higher probabilities for those who stay at both top and bottom of the parents’
earnings distribution denote an underlying non-linearity and imply a presence of
ceilings and ﬂoors at the top and bottom of the transition matrices. Poverty traps
can also arise from institutions that govern economic interactions and market failures,
which contribute to the persistence of inequality among families and lower the level
32of mobility (see for example Bowles and Gintis, 2002). This can primarily aﬀect
the lowest strata of the earnings distribution. Further empirical studies are required
in order to determine and interpret the pattern and degree of nonlinearities in the
Swedish intergenerational earnings mobility.
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37Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
Daughters Sons
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Age in 1999 35.43 1.11 34.00 37.00 35.43 1.11 34.00 37.00
Log family earnings 1999 12.49 0.92 3.13 16.39 12.51 0.86 3.97 16.39
Father’s age in 1970 36.63 6.93 22.00 77.00 36.62 6.93 20.00 76.00
Parents’ average of 1970 10.61 0.44 6.45 12.87 10.61 0.44 6.06 12.88
1975 log family earnings
Sample Size 37044 38674
38Table 2: Intergenerational Elasticities for Daughters
Swedena United Statesb
Full Married Whose Full Married Whose
Sample Sample Husbands Sample Sample Husbands
Have Positive Have Positive
Earnings Earnings
Dep. Variable
Log Family 0.249 0.250 0.240 0.429 0.408 0.387
Income (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.063) (0.055) (0.055)
Log (Ew + Eh) 0.250 0.240 0.386 0.348
(0.009) (0.008) (0.065) (0.063)
Log (Eh) 0.231 0.360
(0.013) (0.079)
Log S -0.009 0.012
(0.009) (0.052)
Sample Size 37044 17455 17115 533 372 365
a) The independent variable is daugters’ family labour earnings.
b) The U.S. results are from Chadwick and Solon (2002)
39Table 3: Intergenerational Elasticities for Sons
Swedena United Statesb
Full Married Married Full Married Married
Sample Sample With Positive Sample Sample With Positive
Earnings Earnings
Dep. Variable
Log Family 0.296 0.258 0.257 0.535 0.541 0.508
Income (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.059) (0.062) (0.058)
Log (Ew + Eh) 0.258 0.257 0.585 0.552
(0.010) (0.009) (0.067) (0.063)
Log (Eh) 0.297 0.523
(0.013) (0.077)
Log S 0.040 -0.030
(0.009) (0.046)
Sample Size 38674 15069 14834 501 340 338
a) The independent variable is sons’ family labour earnings.
b) The U.S. results are from Chadwick and Solon (2002)






Log Family 0.239 0.230
Earnings (0.008) (0.007)






Sample Size 25516 24967
a) Labour earnings are used for the Swedish data.






Log Family 0.248 0.238
Earnings (0.008) (0.007)






Sample Size 23192 22822
a) Labour earnings are used for the Swedish data.
42Table 6: Quantile Regression Results for Daughters
Full Sample
Quantilea
OLSb 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95
Dep. Variable
Log Family 0.249 0.350 0.245 0.190 0.218 0.210 0.258 0.266
Labour Earnings (0.011) (0.044) (0.026) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Sample Size 37044
Married Sample
Log Family 0.250 0.270 0.217 0.205 0.204 0.247 0.262 0.258
Labour Earnings (0.009) (0.033) (0.021) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018)
Sample Size 17455
Whose Husbands have Positive Earningsc
Log Family 0.240 0.235 0.198 0.201 0.206 0.247 0.263 0.257
Labour Earnings (0.008) (0.026) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015)
Log (Eh) 0.231 0.298 0.203 0.122 0.166 0.255 0.264 0.275
(0.013) (0.056) (0.035) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021)
Log S -0.009 -0.024 -0.040 -0.021 -0.009 -0.007 -0.024 -0.031
(0.009) (0.045) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Sample Size 17115
a) Bootstrapped standard errors for quantile regressions in parentheses.
b) Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used for the OLS regressions.
c) Note that β = Sβh+(1− S)βw does not hold when using quantile regression.
43Table 7: Quantile Regression Results for Sons
Full Sample
Quantilea
OLSb 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95
Dep. Variable
Log Family 0.296 0.454 0.374 0.241 0.281 0.248 0.272 0.278
Labour Earnings (0.010) (0.053) (0.025) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Sample Size 38674
Married Sample
Log Family 0.258 0.290 0.295 0.249 0.230 0.271 0.276 0.276
Labour Earnings (0.010) (0.029) (0.024) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Sample Size 15069
Married Sons with Positive Earningsc
Log Family 0.257 0.300 0.282 0.242 0.228 0.270 0.274 0.278
Labour Earnings (0.009) (0.027) (0.026) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020)
Log (Eh) 0.297 0.433 0.368 0.209 0.252 0.305 0.324 0.308
(0.013) (0.092) (0.040) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
Log S 0.040 0.078 0.035 0.030 0.038 0.038 -0.006 -0.008
(0.009) (0.029) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
Sample Size 14834
a) Bootstrapped standard errors for quantile regressions in parentheses.
b) Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used for the OLS regressions.
c) Note that β = Sβh+(1− S)βw does not hold when using quantile regression.
44Table 8: Parents-Daughter Family Labour Earnings Transition Matrices (Full Sample)
Parents’ Daughter’s Decile
Decile
Top 9th 8th 7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Bottom
Top 0.244 0.142 0.092 0.057 0.071 0.076 0.092 0.081 0.062 0.081
9th 0.163 0.121 0.104 0.088 0.079 0.088 0.101 0.093 0.078 0.083
8th 0.117 0.122 0.110 0.105 0.085 0.091 0.101 0.100 0.082 0.086
7th 0.095 0.107 0.114 0.102 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.095 0.095 0.090
6th 0.087 0.108 0.111 0.108 0.110 0.103 0.091 0.092 0.104 0.085
5th 0.081 0.105 0.108 0.105 0.105 0.101 0.103 0.097 0.105 0.090
4th 0.075 0.085 0.103 0.115 0.105 0.111 0.101 0.111 0.101 0.093
3rd 0.064 0.082 0.109 0.115 0.120 0.108 0.103 0.098 0.104 0.095
2nd 0.045 0.079 0.086 0.114 0.122 0.104 0.105 0.112 0.118 0.115
Bottom 0.046 0.069 0.080 0.096 0.112 0.114 0.103 0.111 0.130 0.138
Sample Size: 37044 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.116, Asymptotic Standard Error: 0.004
45Table 9: Parents-Son Family Labour Earnings Transition Matrices (Full Sample)
Parents’ Son’s Decile
Decile
Top 9th 8th 7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Bottom
Top 0.266 0.143 0.097 0.078 0.073 0.082 0.066 0.059 0.060 0.075
9th 0.171 0.132 0.101 0.0.93 0.091 0.097 0.079 0.083 0.071 0.081
8th 0.124 0.120 0.111 0.103 0.095 0.101 0.091 0.090 0.084 0.082
7th 0.096 0.117 0.108 0.107 0.104 0.104 0.101 0.093 0.083 0.085
6th 0.087 0.111 0.116 0.092 0.109 0.103 0.099 0.100 0.095 0.088
5th 0.068 0.099 0.113 0.113 0.099 0.103 0.111 0.110 0.090 0.093
4th 0.067 0.082 0.100 0.118 0.107 0.107 0.112 0.106 0.113 0.088
3rd 0.051 0.085 0.093 0.104 0.111 0.100 0.119 0.122 0.117 0.097
2nd 0.044 0.074 0.091 0.101 0.115 0.110 0.112 0.115 0.128 0.111
Bottom 0.039 0.059 0.082 0.097 0.099 0.098 0.108 0.120 0.141 0.156
Sample Size: 38674. Kendall’s tau-b: 0.153, Asymptotic Standard Error: 0.004
46Table 10: Parents-Son Family Labour Earnings Transition Matrices (Married Sample)
Parents’ Son’s Decile
Decile
Top 9th 8th 7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Bottom
Top 0.286 0.178 0.119 0.100 0.058 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.045 0.051
9th 0.181 0.157 0.135 0.097 0.095 0.072 0.064 0.068 0.067 0.073
8th 0.135 0.125 0.115 0.105 0.111 0.083 0.084 0.093 0.076 0.078
7th 0.090 0.101 0.128 0.120 0.109 0.109 0.087 0.099 0.093 0.077
6th 0.075 0.101 0.109 0.119 0.108 0.107 0.107 0.097 0.093 0.089
5th 0.058 0.085 0.105 0.117 0.099 0.102 0.123 0.097 0.100 0.096
4th 0.056 0.083 0.075 0.095 0.116 0.121 0.119 0.117 0.114 0.103
3rd 0.045 0.073 0.079 0.097 0.117 0.118 0.125 0.114 0.128 0.120
2nd 0.048 0.058 0.087 0.097 0.105 0.115 0.108 0.122 0.128 0.130
Bottom 0.037 0.053 0.068 0.069 0.085 0.118 0.124 0.130 0.136 0.154
Sample Size: 15069. Kendall’s tau-b: 0.207, Asymptotic Standard Error: 0.006
47Table 11: Parents-Daughter Family Labour Earnings Transition Matrices (Married Sample)
Parents’ Daughter’s Decile
Decile
Top 9th 8th 7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Bottom
Top 0.272 0.171 0.121 0.078 0.070 0.045 0.052 0.060 0.062 0.069
9th 0.174 0.138 0.125 0.103 0.105 0.073 0.070 0.072 0.065 0.075
8th 0.120 0.126 0.117 0.112 0.104 0.097 0.080 0.073 0.091 0.079
7th 0.091 0.116 0.105 0.108 0.107 0.102 0.106 0.087 0.100 0.082
6th 0.083 0.097 0.099 0.116 0.109 0.106 0.115 0.102 0.083 0.091
5th 0.067 0.091 0.111 0.116 0.090 0.101 0.113 0.114 0.104 0.092
4th 0.069 0.081 0.094 0.104 0.107 0.116 0.104 0.114 0.109 0.102
3rd 0.053 0.081 0.080 0.096 0.112 0.120 0.115 0.119 0.112 0.112
2nd 0.036 0.058 0.084 0.096 0.108 0.105 0.129 0.114 0.132 0.127
Bottom 0.043 0.053 0.076 0.086 0.087 0.124 0.119 0.128 0.140 0.144
Sample Size: 17455. Kendall’s tau-b: 0.182, Asymptotic Standard Error: 0.006
48Table 12: Mobility Rankings
Mobility Rankings Shorrocks Index Sum of Leading Diagonal Bartholomew Index
and Adjacent Cells
Full Sample
Parents-daughter 0.973 (1) 3.298 (1) 29.641 (1)
Parents-son 0.961 (2) 3.417 (2) 28.517 (2)
Married Sample
Parents-daughter 0.962 (1) 3.527 (1) 27.641 (1)
Parents-son 0.955 (2) 3.691 (2) 26.843 (2)
Index with rank in parentheses; 1, most mobile
49A Appendix
Table A1 to A9 report the estimated intergenerational elasticities for daughters and
sons using total income.
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics.
Daughters Sons
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Age in 1999 35.43 1.11 34.00 37.00 35.43 1.11 34.00 37.00
Log family earnings 1999 12.62 0.75 2.30 17.94 12.61 0.74 0.70 16.62
Father’s age in 1970 36.63 6.93 22.00 77.00 36.62 6.93 20.00 76.00
Parents’ average of 1970- 10.63 0.42 6.45 13.21 10.64 0.42 7.36 13.58
1975 log family earnings
Sample Size 38209 40099
50Table A2: Intergenerational Elasticities for Daughters
Swedena United Statesb
Full Married Whose Full Married Whose
Sample Sample Husbands Sample Sample Husbands
Have Positive Have Positive
Earnings Earnings
Dep. Variable
Log Family 0.225 0.238 0.237 0.429 0.408 0.387
Income (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.063) (0.055) (0.055)
Log (Ew + Eh) 0.238 0.237 0.386 0.348
(0.008) (0.008) (0.065) (0.063)
Log (Eh) 0.224 0.360
(0.012) (0.079)
Log S -0.013 0.012
(0.007) (0.052)
Sample Size 38209 17529 17410 533 372 365
a) The independent variable is daugters’ family total income.
b) The U.S. results are from Chadwick and Solon (2002)
c) Note that β = Sβh+(1− S)βw does not hold when using quantile regression.
51Table A3: Intergenerational Elasticities for Sons
Swedena United Statesb
Full Married Married Full Married Married
Sample Sample With Positive Sample Sample With Positive
Earnings Earnings
Dep. Variable
Log Family 0.272 0.254 0.254 0.535 0.541 0.508
Income (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.059) (0.062) (0.058)
Log (Ew + Eh) 0.254 0.254 0.585 0.552
(0.009) (0.008) (0.067) (0.063)
Log (Eh) 0.307 0.523
(0.012) (0.077)
Log S 0.054 -0.030
(0.007) (0.046)
Sample Size 40099 15144 15070 501 340 338
a) The independent variable is sons’ family total income.
b) The U.S. results are from Chadwick and Solon (2002)
52Table A4: Quantile Regression Results for Daughters
Full Sample
Quantilea
OLSb 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95
Dep. Variable
Log Family 0.225 0.153 0.164 0.198 0.181 0.224 0.297 0.318
Labour Earnings (0.011) (0.035) (0.014) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Sample Size 38209
Married Sample
Log Family 0.238 0.126 0.116 0.147 0.197 0.283 0.320 0.353
Labour Earnings (0.010) (0.024) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.025)
Sample Size 17529
Whose Husbands have Positive Earningsc
Log Family 0.237 0.127 0.116 0.149 0.198 0.283 0.323 0.355
Labour Earnings (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017)
Log (Eh) 0.224 0.080 0.101 0.119 0.193 0.290 0.314 0.323
(0.013) (0.039) (0.024) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025)
Log S -0.013 -0.089 -0.053 -0.018 0.006 0.028 0.035 0.038
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Sample Size 17410
a) Bootstrapped standard errors for quantile regressions in parentheses.
b) Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used for the OLS regressions.
c) Note that β = Sβh+(1− S)βw does not hold when using quantile regression.
53Table A5: Quantile Regression Results for Sons
Full Sample
Quantilea
OLSb 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95
Dep. Variable
Log Family 0.272 0.215 0.195 0.243 0.273 0.268 0.327 0.358
Labour Earnings (0.010) (0.029) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014)
Sample Size 40099
Married Sample
Log Family 0.254 0.166 0.173 0.180 0.228 0.290 0.340 0.333
Labour Earnings (0.010) (0.030) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
Sample Size 15144
Married Sons with Positive Earningsc
Log Family 0.254 0.152 0.165 0.180 0.228 0.290 0.340 0.333
Labour Earnings (0.010) (0.025) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.025)
Log (Eh) 0.307 0.018 0.197 0.212 0.282 0.374 0.403 0.397
(0.014) (0.044) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027)
Log S 0.054 -0.011 0.013 0.040 0.062 0.079 0.068 0.063
(0.008) (0.034) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Sample Size 15070
a) Bootstrapped standard errors for quantile regressions in parentheses.
b) Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used for the OLS regressions.
c) Note that β = Sβh+(1− S)βw does not hold when using quantile regression.
54Table A6: Parents-Daughter Family Labour Earnings Transition Matrices (Full Sample)
Parents’ Daughter’s Decile
Decile
Top 9th 8th 7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Bottom
Top 0.257 0.140 0.089 0.060 0.056 0.074 0.096 0.092 0.053 0.081
9th 0.164 0.124 0.098 0.094 0.077 0.081 0.099 0.098 0.078 0.087
8th 0.122 0.118 0.113 0.104 0.096 0.083 0.099 0.100 0.088 0.077
7th 0.086 0.109 0.109 0.102 0.104 0.089 0.111 0.105 0.097 0.087
6th 0.090 0.105 0.109 0.112 0.104 0.100 0.092 0.094 0.104 0.091
5th 0.076 0.104 0.109 0.104 0.110 0.105 0.099 0.096 0.108 0.089
4th 0.070 0.089 0.108 0.108 0.107 0.120 0.097 0.101 0.104 0.097
3rd 0.062 0.083 0.104 0.109 0.122 0.124 0.101 0.094 0.101 0.100
2nd 0.048 0.078 0.094 0.112 0.121 0.112 0.101 0.107 0.118 0.109
Bottom 0.046 0.063 0.087 0.101 0.111 0.113 0.107 0.106 0.126 0.140
Sample Size: 38209 Kendall’s tau-b: 0.115, Asymptotic Standard Error: 0.004
55Table A7: Parents-Son Family Labour Earnings Transition Matrices (Full Sample)
Parents’ Son’s Decile
Decile
Top 9th 8th 7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Bottom
Top 0.285 0.149 0.095 0.067 0.059 0.079 0.073 0.059 0.053 0.081
9th 0.179 0.134 0.097 0.093 0.084 0.086 0.096 0.079 0.069 0.082
8th 0.122 0.122 0.116 0.095 0.094 0.103 0.088 0.086 0.088 0.086
7th 0.091 0.118 0.110 0.107 0.101 0.098 0.112 0.092 0.088 0.082
6th 0.078 0.110 0.120 0.106 0.101 0.106 0.100 0.101 0.099 0.079
5th 0.061 0.098 0.114 0.105 0.114 0.101 0.101 0.117 0.098 0.091
4th 0.063 0.080 0.104 0.120 0.115 0.101 0.110 0.106 0.110 0.091
3rd 0.055 0.083 0.089 0.109 0.123 0.101 0.108 0.118 0.115 0.098
2nd 0.047 0.067 0.087 0.107 0.120 0.111 0.111 0.118 0.124 0.108
Bottom 0.038 0.060 0.082 0.097 0.098 0.115 0.100 0.118 0.140 0.150
Sample Size: 40099. Kendall’s tau-b: 0.153, Asymptotic Standard Error: 0.004
56Table A8: Parents-Daughter Family Labour Earnings Transition Matrices (Married Sample)
Parents’ Daughter’s Decile
Decile
Top 9th 8th 7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Bottom
Top 0.286 0.169 0.112 0.083 0.067 0.047 0.045 0.045 0.060 0.085
9th 0.177 0.143 0.134 0.112 0.080 0.095 0.064 0.057 0.065 0.073
8th 0.100 0.111 0.121 0.135 0.109 0.092 0.088 0.083 0.079 0.082
7th 0.090 0.107 0.114 0.108 0.109 0.102 0.094 0.105 0.88 0.081
6th 0.076 0.098 0.090 0.106 0.111 0.112 0.109 0.106 0.092 0.100
5th 0.070 0.096 0.098 0.114 0.109 0.098 0.112 0.105 0.102 0.101
4th 0.064 0.078 0.096 0.100 0.112 0.108 0.108 0.119 0.113 0.101
3rd 0.053 0.077 0.082 0.094 0.110 0.109 0.128 0.119 0.128 0.100
2nd 0.039 0.062 0.088 0.090 0.099 0.125 0.132 0.123 0.119 0.123
Bottom 0.043 0.057 0.071 0.086 0.106 0.108 0.120 0.129 0.140 0.141
Sample Size: 17529. Kendall’s tau-b: 0.182, Asymptotic Standard Error: 0.006
57Table A9: Parents-Son Family Labour Earnings Transition Matrices (Married Sample)
Parents’ Son’s Decile
Decile
Top 9th 8th 7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Bottom
Top 0.304 0.189 0.114 0.095 0.071 0.044 0.044 0.038 0.044 0.057
9th 0.180 0.166 0.139 0.104 0.076 0.066 0.066 0.058 0.064 0.081
8th 0.132 0.127 0.121 0.098 0.104 0.089 0.089 0.075 0.090 0.074
7th 0.090 0.096 0.126 0.111 0.113 0.100 0.089 0.093 0.100 0.082
6th 0.076 0.095 0.105 0.127 0.109 0.111 0.100 0.087 0.099 0.090
5th 0.056 0.080 0.096 0.108 0.115 0.128 0.099 0.127 0.092 0.098
4th 0.047 0.076 0.086 0.090 0.118 0.120 0.126 0.118 0.116 0.101
3rd 0.046 0.070 0.084 0.095 0.109 0.110 0.117 0.145 0.107 0.115
2nd 0.042 0.057 0.083 0.099 0.101 0.113 0.129 0.137 0.125 0.112
Bottom 0.034 0.059 0.062 0.080 0.089 0.126 0.134 0.114 0.150 0.152
Sample Size: 15144. Kendall’s tau-b: 0.216, Asymptotic Standard Error: 0.006
58